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CEPS, with financial assistance of the Finnish SITRA Foundation, embarked at the end of
2000 on a programme to examine the impact of Justice and Home Affairs access on an
enlarged European Union, the implications for the candidate countries and for the states with
which they share borders. The aim of this programme is to help establish a better balance
between civil liberties and security in an enlarged Europe.
This project will lead to a series of policy recommendations that will promote cooperation in
EU JHA in the context of an enlarged Europe as well as institutional developments for the
medium- to long-term in areas such as a European Public Prosecutors Office, re-shaping
Europol and a developed system of policing the external frontier (Euro Border Guard). These
must be made within a balanced framework. There are two key issues:
  First of all, to prevent the distortion of the agenda by “events” – some items are being
accelerated and other marginalised. This risks upsetting the balance, carefully crafted by the
Finnish Presidency, between freedom, security and justice. The current ‘threat’ is that security
issues, at the expense of the others, will predominate after the catastrophic events of 11th
September. These have resulted in a formidable political shock, which served as a catalyst to
promote certain initiatives on the political agenda, such as the European arrest warrant, and a
common definition of terrorism. The monitoring of items, which could be marginalised and
the nature of the institutional/political blockages that could distort the Tampere agenda, is our
priority.
  Secondly, how to look beyond the  Tampere agenda, both in terms of providing a flexible
approach during the period of completion of the Tampere programme as well as what should
come afterwards. Much detail remains to be filled in about rigid items on the Tampere agenda
and CEPS will continue to work in three very important areas:
•  Arrangements for managing and policing the external frontier
•  Judicial cooperation leading to the development of a European Public Prosecutor
•  Strengthening of  Europol, particularly in the field of serious trans-frontier violence and
moves towards a more federalised policing capacity
The CEPS-SITRA  programme brings together a multi-disciplinary network of 20 experts
drawn from EU member states, applicant countries as well as  neighbouring states: the
European University Institute in Florence, the Stefan Batory Foundation (Warsaw), European
Academy of Law (ERA  Trier), Academy of Sciences (Moscow), London School of
Economics, International Office of Migration (Helsinki), Fondation  Nationale des Sciences
Politiques (CERI) in France, Universities of Budapest, Université Catholique de Louvain-la-
Neuve, University of Lisbon ( Autonoma), University of  Nijmegen, University of Burgos,
CEIFO in Stockholm, University of  Tilberg and University of Vilnius, as well as members
with practical judicial and legislative backgrounds.1
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Minority Issues from the EU Perspective
When one considers the substance of European Union (EU) official documents in a simplified
way, national and ethnical minorities may appear in three contexts.
The first belongs to external relations (common foreign and security policy), which cover
minorities as a matter of human rights in third countries. These documents call upon the
(third) countries concerned to respect human rights and international and European standards
on minorities’ rights that are also endorsed by the EU. In this regard, the legislation being
developed in view of a common European migration policy contains provisions about the
respect of minority rights in order to prevent further migration waves.
The second context relates to the integration of lawfully residing nationals of third countries
taking into consideration the cultural and historical ties of these communities with the
member states. Migrants, or diasporas, from third countries are expected to integrate or return
and potential migrants to stay in their countries as it has been defined by the Justice and
Home Affairs (JHA) objectives.
Lastly, the evolving principle of non-discrimination has been developed in various fields of
Community law by prohibiting unequal treatment on racial grounds. The provisions
concerning the prohibition of discrimination in Europe have been inserted in Article 13 of the
EC Treaty. Due to recent developments, it has been gradually changed, as the Charter of
Fundamental Rights may extend the ban on discrimination, (Art. 21 of the Charter), on the
basis of membership of a national minority, regardless to citizenship. Moreover, the Tampere
Council Conclusions have declared the aim to increase the efforts on social, economic and
family integration of  diasporas or ethnic minorities residing legally on (the) EU territory
regardless of nationality.
“Ethnic minorities” are usually considered to be those members of national groups of third
countries residing outside or inside the EU and who enjoy basic, fundamental human rights
but in certain cases, they are considered as Union citizens facing racism, intolerance or
exclusion in general, without special connection to ethnic identities or the inter-ethnical
tensions. In other words, up to the recent past, the ethnic issue was rather an  indirectly
formulated policy or a policy that was regulated within other policies and not as an issue to be
tackled separately. Today the “ethnic minority” issue has become a policy in its own right, as
it would concern future citizens of the Union after accession. Therefore, it became part of the
Copenhagen political criteria. Referring to principles of Community law (such as the rule of
law, the stability of the system, the prohibition of discrimination, the respect for constitutional
traditions and national identity of member states), an “educating” aspect has emerged from
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the criteria defined in the Copenhagen Conclusions. The observation of minority rights calls
for a respect of the standards on minorities developed within the Council of Europe and
CSCE frameworks. Confirming this requirement as a necessary component, the situation of
ethnic minorities and in particular the development of their rights and their socio-economic
integration has been monitored and evaluated by the Commission in its regular reports on
candidate countries. However, the attention has been limited to the discrimination and
exclusion of  Roma, although for instance there are further 12 lawfully registered ethnic
minorities in Hungary (Act No.67 of 1993). This should serve as a good illustration of the,
still dominant, “non-discrimination and non-exclusion” approach of the EU instead of moving
towards a comprehensive “ethnic identity” discourse.
Moreover, the pre-accession agreement with Hungary and the Tampere Council Conclusions
underline the importance of the implementation of JHA and especially of the Schengen acquis
before accession. This top priority includes also the visa restrictions and the control on
immigration, asylum and external borders. These instruments shall be implemented to
regulate the entry of third country nationals to the territory of the EU regardless of their ethnic
background (even if an important number of persons belonging to national minorities is likely
to suffer from these barriers). The Union is facing a new problem in that the populations of
the ‘old members’ were far more homogeneous than those of the new accession countries and
they did not have minorities living in neighbouring non-EU countries. This explains why the
problem of minorities has not been tackled until now in the context of Justice and Home
Affairs, although this is likely to become one of the most complex issues of the current
enlargement process.
Pre-Accession Efforts in the Area of JHA in Hungary
In the past 80 years, millions of ethnic Hungarians lost their Hungarian citizenship, after the
changes of borders agreed on in international and bilateral treaties. They thereby became
minorities in the surrounding countries, and their connections with the mother country
became unclear for officials in the European Community. Some illustrations can be found by
the following examples.
Since 1989, a new doctrine in foreign policy has been developed in Hungary – the system of
triple priorities. Theoretically, it contains three equal objectives: the Euro-Atlantic integration
of Hungary, a stable and friendly relationship with neighbouring countries in the entire region
and the governmental responsibility for ethnic Hungarians living on the other side of the
borders, as the boundaries of the state are not overlapping with the ones of the nation.
However, these three priorities in Hungarian foreign policy are very difficult to reconcile. In
the meantime, the setting-up of a new view on migratory movements in the EU reached
Hungary. In the early 1990s, forced migration, freedom to travel, the revival of ethnic links as
well as “irregular tourism” provided a big boom in migration statistics, which reached
consolidation only at the end of the past decade. Table 1 gives an overview of the number and
composition of aliens entering, commuting to and residing in contemporary Hungary.THE CASE OF THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY
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Table 1. Frequency of travel and commuting movements into Hungary
Number of
persons crossing
the border of
Hungary with:
1998 1999 2000 Total Estimated
number of
ethnic
Hungarians
a
Slovakia 22 304 592 18 123 592 14 973 374 55 401 558 11 080 311
Ukraine 5 596 996 4 498 146 5 845 869 15 941 011 3 188 202
Romania 11 612 826 10 494 141 12 477 462 34 584 429 6 916 885
Yugoslavia 7 598 321 4 921 295 6 587 175 19 106 791 3 821 358
Croatia 8 772 255 8 467 532 9 399 624 26 639 411 5 327 882
Slovenia 4 402 953 3 047 196 2 781 313 10 231 467 1 023 146
a The author’s estimation is based on the composition in various migrant groups due to the absence of ethnic
registration made by authorities.
Source: National Headquarters of the Border Guard, Office of Immigration and Naturalisation Affairs - Ministry
of the Interior (www.b-m.hu).
The visa-free system may explain the high number of border-crossings. The frequent travel,
border crossing and commuting movement would be proved by figures on issued residence
permits. Table 2 covers citizens from the neighbouring states.
Table 2. Numbers of short-term residency permits issued, 1998-2000
Number of short-term
residence permits (less
than one year validity)
issued for citizens of:
1998 1999 2000 Total Estimated number
of ethnic
Hungarians from
the total
a
Slovakia 315 518 1 166 1 999 1 599
Romania 7 428 10 125 13 071 30 624 28 000
Ukraine 1 739 1 951 2 676 6 366 3 183
Yugoslavia 1 815 1 355 961 4 131 3 304
Number of long-term
residence permits (more
than one year validity)
issued for citizens of:
1998 1999 2000 Total Estimated number
of ethnic
Hungarians from
the total number
Slovakia n.a. n.a. n.a.
Romania 6 216 8 449 10 626 25 291 20 232
Ukraine 1 439 2 047 2 421 5 907 35 442
Yugoslavia 1 560 2 023 2 035 5 618 3 932
a The author’s estimation is based on the composition in various migrant groups due to absence of ethnic
registration made by authorities.
Source: National Headquarters of the Border Guard, Office of Immigration and Naturalisation Affairs -
Ministry of the Interior (www.b-m.hu).JUDIT TOTH
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The comparison of the numbers of residence permit holders and travellers from the same state
indicates that ethnic movement is characterised by short-term, frequent or commuter travel to
Hungary. This trend can be explained partly by the selective or inefficient implementation of
the bureaucratic and rigid alien police authorisation in the country. Until 1990, the
departures of citizens from the surrounding countries were strongly limited or controlled for
various reasons. Since 1990, the alien police authorisation (residence permits, immigration
permits), the naturalisation and the labour authorisation have been gradually modified: their
provisions have become more and more restrictive and severe sanctions in law enforcement
have been introduced. Table 3 may give a certain impression on the evolution of the
legislation. However, a straight and smooth way towards a proper infrastructure and personnel
facilities as well as the political will of consequent application can hardly be observed.
Table 3. The evolution of legislation on border controls and employment
Applicable rules on border control and surveillance
Until 31 October 1997
Law-decree (1974) on state and public
security Police Act (some provisions) (1994).
Decree of the Council of Ministers on border
protection (1974). Decree on border control
issued by Minister of the Interior (1975).
Decree of the Council of Ministers on border
zones (1989). Act on Amendment of the
Constitution of the Hungarian Republic No
CVII of 1993.
1 November 1997
Act on border guard and border protection (*)
No. XXXII of 1997. Decree on its execution
issued by the Minister of the Interior (1997).
Decrees of the Government relating to the
Act.
Major amendments since 1997
Act No LXXV of 1999 (entered into force: 1
st
September 1999). Act No LXIX of 1999
(entered into force: 1
st
 March 2000). Act No.
XXXIII of 2001 (entered into force: 1
st
January 2002 with some exceptions).
-  Entitlement for clandestine investigation
power in criminal cases
-  Entitlement to collect and store the
personal data of each person crossing the
border regardless of citizenship, activity,
and circumstances for a period of 90 days
-  Border guards can be made accountable
for legal practices
-  Institutional changes inside the border
guard system at regional and local level
-  Distinction made between the external
(EU) and internal borders and their
respective regimesTHE CASE OF THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY
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Applicable rules on entry and residence and on immigration of aliens to Hungary
Until 30 April 1994
Law-decree (1982) on alien police.
Decree on its execution (1982) issued by
the Minister of the Interior. Act on Fees
(1990).
1 May 1994
Act on entry and residence and on
immigration of aliens to Hungary (*) No.
LXXXVI of 1993 (into force: 1 May
1994). Decree of the Government (1994)
on execution. Decrees on execution issued
by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1994).
Minister of the Interior (1994). Minister
of the Finance (1994). Minister of Justice
(1995).
Major amendments since 1997
Act No. XXXIV of 1994 (into force: 1
May 1994). Act No. LXVI of 1996 (into
force: 1 September 1996). Act No.
CXXXIX of 1997 (into force: 1 March
1998). Act No. XII of 1998. Act No.
CXVII of 1999 (into force: 20 February
2000). Act No. LXXV of 1999 (some
amendments entered into force on 1
September 1999 and others on 1 January
2000). Act No. X of 2000 (into force: 1
March 2000).
A totally new Act on Entry and Residence
of Aliens No. XXXIX of 2001 will enter
into force on 1
st
 January 2002 (with some
exceptions). Its executive decree issued by
the Government No. 170 of 2001.
-  Restrictions on detention and movement
of illegal migrants
-  Special exception due to NATO
membership
-  Extended (not necessarily lawful)
reasons to put names on the list of
undesired aliens
-  Sanctions against air carriers
-  Extended regime of personal data
collection, storage and international
transfer
-  Changes of competence
-  Establishment of a central migration
authority
-  Restriction in visa issue procedures
-  More rigid rules on expulsion and
rejection at the border (refoulement)
-  Withdrawal of residence permit and
immigration permit
-  Making the legal status of settled
migrants more fragile
-  Stringent alien police control
-  Combating human traffickingJUDIT TOTH
6
Applicable rules on foreign labour
Until 28 February 1991
Ministerial decree on employment of aliens
in Hungary issued by the Minister of
Labour (1991).
1 March 1991
Act on labour services and unemployment
benefits No. IV of 1991 (into force: 1
March 1991). Art.7 regulates the
employment of foreign labourers in
Hungary. Ministerial decree on its
execution issued by the competent minister
(Minister of Labour, 1991).
Amendments since 1 March 1991
Act No. LII of 1995 (enters into force: 1
July 1995). Act No. CVII of 1996 (enters
into force 1 January 1997). Act No. CXX
of 1997 (enters into force 1 January 1998).
Act No. LXXXIX of 2000 (enters into
force 26 June 2000). Act No. XXIV of
2001 (enters into force: 1 July 2001).
Modification of Ministerial decree on
labour authorisation of foreigners in
Hungary issued by the Minister of Social
Affairs (1995, 1996, 1998) by the Minister
of Social and Family Affairs (1999, 2000).
-  Changing competence of labour authority
-  Exceptions from labour authorisation
(e.g. key personnel of companies)
-  Benefited authorisation for certain
labourers
-  Upgraded sanctions against illegal
employmentTHE CASE OF THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY
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Applicable rules on citizenship
Until 30 September 1993
Act on Hungarian Citizenship No. V of
1957. Law-decree on its execution (1957).
Act No. XXVII of 1990. Act No. XXXII
of 1990.
1 October 1993
Act on Hungarian Citizenship* No. LV of
1993. Government Decree on citizenship
procedures (1993).
Amendments since 1 October 1993
Act No. XXXII of 2001 (enters into force:
15 July 2001). Government Decree No.
103/2001 on amendment of citizenship
procedure (enters into force: 15 July
2001).
-  Benefited naturalisation of stateless
persons that were educated or settled
in Hungary.
-  Easier withdrawal of naturalisation.
-  More liberal rule of renunciation of
Hungarian citizenship.
-  Procedural guarantees in citizenship
affairs
* It shall be passed/modified with qualified majority (two third) of votes in the Parliament.
This process is on going. Last summer, the Parliament adopted Acts on amendments of the
Border Control Act, the Hungarian Citizenship Act, and the new Aliens Act. These acts
together with their enforcement rules entered into force in January 2002.
Besides the legal approximation, the PHARE, Twining and Horizontal Programmes, and the
pre-accession  cooperation have contributed through training, finance, exchange of
experiences and assistance, to improve the capacity and the action potential in law
enforcement. Due to co-finance requirements of the EU programmes, the national budget also
has to share these huge expenditures. Furthermore, the control on external border crossing,
residence of aliens, lawful employment of foreign workers, asylum restrictions and combating
organised crime make no difference among aliens on the ethnical ground. Consequently,
Hungarians belonging to the ethnic minorities are subject to the same migration restrictions,
surveillance, alien policing and sanctions as all the other migrants.
However, the  visa-free travel and bilateral agreements on friendship and good
neighbourhood could be considered as the panacea for this “ethnically neutral but anti-
national policy”. Since 1990, governments have made severe efforts to extend the zone of
friendly relationships in and on the near and wider environment of Hungary. Therefore, 19
such agreements were concluded up to 2000. They contain commitments on keeping and
strengthening the unimpeded and mutual communication among citizens, the cultural
exchange and respect of human rights, including the minority rights.
In parallel to the development of secondary rules on visa restrictions, on the format of visas,
on the criteria to issue a visa and on the exchange of information concerning the visa regime
at EU–level, a  “Schengen panic” rose among ethnic Hungarians. They fear the rise of new
walls on the Eastern borders of Hungary by border guards, visas, mobile units, police and
labour authorisations, readmission agreements and immigration rules regulating the entry and
residence of third country nationals. Although several bricks of the wall are already  in place,JUDIT TOTH
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the visa is considered as the most brutal and final element of the new construction. Not only
Cuba or Mongolia but Moldova, Belarus, Macedonia, the Russian Federation and CIS
countries in Asia have been put on the list of states whose nationals must be in possession of a
visa in order to entry Hungary. The visa-free system with Romania, Ukraine and Yugoslavia is
intended to be kept until accession in order to allow migrations of ethnic minorities into the
country and to prevent stronger anti-European feelings in public opinion. (See Appendix 1).
Possible Ramifications of the Enlargement for Hungary
The possible implications of the accession to the EU and of the implementation of the acquis
communautaire, including the JHA provisions, must be considered by both the new as well as
old members. The impact of mechanically introduced visa and movement restriction on
Hungary in the minority context may be divided into four parts:
(i) External relations
The set up of triple priorities in foreign policy should be reshaped in Hungary with regard to
the second pillar of Community law. For instance, the regional stability and NATO
membership should be evaluated higher while bilateral agreements on friendship would be
less applicable in the light of a common foreign policy. As regards the minority context, the
trust in the entire EU will be reduced if national preferences in each member state (e.g. on the
base of colonial ties) would not be allowed in Hungary. Moreover, the dialogue for better
neighbourhood and regional development will be very efficient in the “ethnic zone”. Hungary
will actively endorse stronger participation of minorities in political life in these societies
through diplomatic and human rights instruments.
 (ii) The economic impact
The benefits of CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement) would be suppressed in
the non-member states replacing the Community customs (tariffs) or rules. Unless other broad
developing and trade agreements are concluded with the EU in order to provide a continuous
regional economic exchange, the border zones and the less developed areas may lose even
limited prosperity. Furthermore, the Schengen regime will limit the movement of workers and
persons in general from the surrounding states whose minority members have played the most
relevant role. For this reason, change in the allocation of small capital and remittances would
reduce the size of the informal economy and ethnic networks in the trade, labour market and
business. On the other hand, the regional tourism, family connections, youth exchange would
be hampered to a certain extent.
(iii) The domestic policy and regulation
The existing institutionalised dialogue with the Hungarian communities across the
EU/external borders might become more structured and regular in the future. The fate of
Hungarians across the EU borders and the related speech discourses may deepen the rupture
between the political parties and actors along the degree of solidarity towards ethnic
Hungarians.  On the other side, the gap could be filled by action in the room for manoeuvre
left for national regulation according to the principle of subsidiarity. By this means, national
legislation could create an extra-community competence, which will bring about a preferential
treatment to ethnic Hungarians while the other residing third country nationals or foreign
workers in Hungary would be discriminated. However, this option is subject to strong
criticism by political opponents and by the neighbouring countries in the Act on Benefits for
Ethnic Hungarians Living in Neighbouring States (See Appendix 2).THE CASE OF THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY
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(iv) The cultural, social and ethnic connections
Due to obstacles in daily communication and connections with the mother country, the
cultural and spiritual component of the identity of minority communities may develop in its
own way. There is a risk that the diaspora will be melted into the majority culture of their
respective host country. On the other hand, the development of telecommunications, Internet
and selected cultural imports will be stronger in traditions that radiate to the mother country.
Furthermore, today’s visa-free travel can eliminate, to a certain extent, the fragmentation of
the nation, but it is accompanied by public law restrictions on residence, asylum and
employment of foreigners in general (and, among them, the Hungarian minorities living
across the borders). The efficient propaganda made by all governments on the dangers posed
by foreigners provokes xenophobic prejudice against foreigners in general and against these
ethnic minorities. While the implementation of the JHA instruments and especially of the visa
regime isolates some parts of the nation, the new walls in the Eastern borders would reduce
these negative feelings amongst a demographically diminishing group of ethnic migrants in
Hungary. In parallel, ethnic isolation brought along through newly “imported” restrictions and
their consequent implementation may reinforce anti-European feelings as well as ethnic
identity and solidarity.
Recommendations
Mutual trust between the EU and Hungary depends on the effective implementation of the
acquis. Although trust is closely interrelated with security, some proposals for trust-building
are offered below.
1.  A clear schedule for enlargement is required for various reasons, inter alia in order to
establish the external border-controlling regime in proper time. For instance, in the case
of Hungary, the best scenario would be an external border of 1103 km, while the worse
scenario would be a border of 1886 km if only Slovenia was the only neighbouring
country that would join the EU at the same time as Hungary. Of course, a realistic and
observed schedule of enlargement would have also a positive impact on public opinion
that is sensitive to the exclusion of ethnic minorities beyond the new EU borders.
2.  In close relation with the schedule on enlargement, a  structured set of instruments
towards outsiders that would include the evolving regional connections, partnerships,
and trade agreements with non-member states should be developed. It may contribute to
provide certain perspectives for Hungarian communities living in non-member countries
for the near future and in medium-term.
3.  It is necessary to reinforce the  international  fora dealing with human rights and
minority rights, such as the Council of Europe, ILO, UNHCR, IOM and CEES, to make
them more influential and effective.
The recent legal opinion of the Venice Committee of the EC on the possible
international connections between mother countries and diasporas (19 October 2001)
should be observed by all interested states, and the Act on Ethnic Hungarians in
neighbouring states (Appendix 2) could be reviewed in light of this opinion. It should be
accompanied with an upgrading of the diplomatic and institutional instruments of
dialogue and legal protection of various groups in need of protection (migrant workers,
minorities, refugees, displaced persons, etc.) together with the countries of origin. These
efforts might include the insertion of  additional applicable provisions in favour of
diasporas and minorities into the "friendship" and other bilateral agreements that have
been concluded between member states and non-member states and their neighbouringJUDIT TOTH
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countries. All of these steps can contribute to a full emancipation of ethnic minorities,
such as Hungarians across the border.
4.  Respect for ethnic minority rights during the entire process of enlargement must be
observed in each candidate country in the same manner and size.
This includes some pressure on the candidate countries to tackle the minority issue in its
whole complexity, covering, amongst others, the social and economic integration of
Roma citizens and combating racism and exclusion.
5.  An important role for the EU is to balance the migration policy in order to upgrade the
capacity of social and economic integration of refugees, foreign workers and third
country nationals resident in the candidate and later the new member states. New rules
or legislation in preparation on family reunification, third country nationals who are
residents in the EU and refugees in the EU, should take into account the issue of
integration in order to balance the restrictive public order measures of Schengen. The
EU may also push for development in the receiving and transit countries. Without this
inclusive policy, the principles and provisions of Community law on equal treatment
and legal protection against racism, social exclusion, and discrimination will be more
visible during the accession procedure.
6.  On the other hand, a certain amount of flexibility or the introduction of transitional
periods for the implementation of the acquis regarding the issue of short-term (up to 3
months), study and labour visa regime seems inevitable.
This would provide a controlled, provisional labour movement of third country
nationals, in parallel with a controlled movement of Hungarian citizens’ inside the EU.
7.  There is still a lack of public control and transparency of the accession procedure in the
candidate countries. This constitutes a key factor in the lack of trust and of the growing
prejudice towards the EU. In order to improve the legitimacy of accession efforts as well
as the legality of JHA, the EU should endorse various constitutional initiatives based on
the rule of law principle in order to contribute building trust. For instance, stronger
police cooperation with candidate countries includes an exchange of personal data –
while the entire mechanism of independent monitoring of the storage, transmission and
protection of data relating to the police sector has not yet been set up. There is a certain
tension between general guarantees on the storage and protection of data in the police
sector and the “interest of efficiency” that is urged in combating organised crime or
illegal migration. For this reason, special guarantees need to be set up in this field
before this vital cooperation is launched. For instance, the ombudsman for the rights of
personal data protection and rights for obtaining public information must be operational,
and the storage and transmission of personal data must be based on statutory or
international public law in Hungary. This should be considered as a compulsive
criterion of accession, as relevant as the respect of the principles of the rule of law or
the prohibition of discrimination.
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APPENDIX 1
To illustrate the complexity and interaction of “minority issues” with JHA, the enlargement
and public opinion, selective quotes from one of Hungary’s highest circulation daily
newspapers (Népszabadság, 15 June 2001) are reproduced below (author’s comments in
Italics).
There is a political turning point in the negotiations, Hungary could close 22 chapters
and we could reach a reasonable compromise in the field of free movement of workers.
[i.e. the member states can maintain the national regulation on employment of
Hungarian citizens for certain periods of time - J.T.] The Government is expecting
that the EU will confirm the conclusion of the negotiations with the most prepared
candidate countries in 2002 during the Gothenburg Summit. Furthermore, according to
the Prime Minister, the Council shall insist on having the 2004 general European
elections to take place in the present candidate countries as well.
The president had a meeting with Jacques  Chirac and Lionel  Jospin. He
summarised the visit to the press. “It is not a secret that the case of the Roma
from  Zámoly  [obtaining asylum in contemporary France -  J.T.] has been
mentioned. My negotiating partners stated France intended not to express her
condemnation of the Hungarian government or Hungarian society. The case was
exclusively based on individual circumstances. The efforts made by the
Hungarian government as well as churches in favour of Roma communities in
order to upgrade their social, material and spiritual integration are respected by
France.
***
Chaotic situation of visa issues in Russian border. A bilateral agreement on
limited visa-free travel has been concluded between Hungary and the Russian
Federation. It provides mutual free entrance for diplomatic and service passport
holders and residence up to 90 days in the territory of the party states. The
agreement entered into force immediately just after signature. [It means that the
prior visa-free agreement has been replaced by the introduction of visa
requirement for ordinary travellers, visitors from the Russian federation and
from Hungary - J.T.] The Hungarian Association of Lorry Drivers initiated a
meeting to discuss the chaotic situation on the visa issue by the Russian
authority. The organisation invited the representative of the responsible
ministries, the border guards and the consular office of the Russian Federation.
The unprepared visa regime caused delays, and there were long queues in front
of the consular office. Consequently, the logistic entrepreneurs or companies
suffer from severe losses. The leader of the consular department of the
Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs underlined that it was in the mutual
interest to simplify the visa procedure. She expressed the hope in the
establishment and the operation of a flexible and, modern visa system despite
this difficult start.
***
The Bill on benefits for Hungarians living across the borders [in its second
reading in the Parliament – J.T.] is not welcomed and reservations have been
made. The statement of the Prime Minister on the labour shortage in near theJUDIT TOTH
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future in the developing Hungarian economy and that this should be
compensated by millions of Hungarians across the border causes more
misunderstandings in the surrounding areas. “The EU also expressed its own
reservations concerning the Bill, and Romania and Slovakia are both criticising
it.  According to the president of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in
Romania, certain reactions of the Romanian government may be projected, in
particular with respect to the implementation of the Act. For instance, it will be a
huge task to collect the applications for family support provided by the
Hungarian government. Moreover, instead of setting up a guest-worker scheme
with ethnic Hungarians in Hungary, one could initiate various programmes to
attract Hungarian capital to Romania establishing new labour here and keeping
the people in homeland.THE CASE OF THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY
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APPENDIX 2
The Hungarian Parliament on 19 of June 2001 adopted Act No. LXII  of 2001 EHLNS
(Official Gazette, 7 July 2001). Excerpts from the non-official translation are reproduced
below.
The Hungarian Parliament
In order to comply with its responsibilities for Hungarians living abroad and to promote the
preservation and development of their manifold relations with Hungary prescribed in
paragraph (3) of Article 6 of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary,
Considering the European integration endeavours of the Republic of Hungary and in-keeping
with the basic principles espoused by international organisations, and in particular by the
Council of Europe and by the European Union, regarding the respect of human rights and the
protection of minority rights;
Having regard to the generally recognised rules of international law, as well as to the
commitments of the Republic of Hungary assumed under international law;
Having regard to the development of bilateral and multilateral relations of good
neighbourhood and regional  cooperation in the Central European area and to the
strengthening of the stabilising role of Hungary;
In order to ensure that Hungarians living in neighbouring countries form part of the
Hungarian nation as a whole and to promote and preserve their getting on in life within their
homeland and awareness of national identity;
Based on the initiative and proposals of the Hungarian Standing Conference
1, a co-ordinating
body functioning in order to preserve and reinforce the awareness of national self-identity of
Hungarian communities living in neighbouring countries;
Without prejudice to the benefits and supports provided by legal rules for persons of ethnic
Hungarians (1) living outside the Hungarian borders in other parts of the world;
Herewith adopts the following Act:
CHAPTER I: GENERAL PROVISIONS
Scope of the Act
Article 1
(1) This Act shall apply to persons declaring themselves to be of ethnic Hungarian who are
not Hungarian citizens and who have their residence in the Republic of Croatia, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic or the
Ukraine, and who
a. have lost their Hungarian citizenship for reasons other than voluntary renunciation
2 and
b. are not in possession of a permit for an open-ended residence [green card for permanent
stay] in Hungary.
                                                
1 Established by the Parliamentary Resolution No. 26 of 1999, 26 March 1999.
2 This provision may be a legal error. It probably intends to cover not only persons who have ever had
Hungarian citizenship (born before 1920), but also their descendants.JUDIT TOTH
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(2) This Act shall also apply to the spouse living together with the person identified in
paragraph (1) and to the children of minor age being raised in their common household
regardless their ethnic origin [even if they are not ethnic Hungarians].
(3) This Act shall also apply to co-operation with, and assistance to organisations specified in
Articles 13, 17, 18 and 25.
Article 2
(1) Persons within the scope of this Act shall be entitled, under the conditions laid down in
this Act, to benefits and supports in the territory of the Republic of Hungary, as well as in
their place of residence in the neighbouring states on the basis of the Certificate specified in
Article 19.
(2) The provisions of this Act shall be applied without prejudice to the obligations of the
Republic of Hungary undertaken in international agreements.
(3) The benefits and supports able to be claimed under this Act shall not affect other existing
benefits and supports possibly ensured by legal rules in force for non-Hungarian citizens who
are ethnic Hungarians and living in other parts of the world.
Article 3
The Republic of Hungary, in order to
a.  ensure the maintenance of permanent contacts,
b.  provide for the accessibility of benefits and supports defined in this Act,
c.  ensure undisturbed cultural, economic and family relations,
d.  ensure the free movement of persons and the free flow of ideas,
and taking into account her international legal obligations, shall provide for the most
beneficial treatment in the given circumstances that are possible with regard to the entry and
stay on its territory for the persons falling within the scope of this Act. […]
Article 27
(1) This Act enters into force on 1 January 2002.
(2) From the date of accession of the Republic of Hungary to the European Union, the
provisions of this Act shall be applied in accordance with the treaty of accession of the
Republic of Hungary and with the European Community law.   ABOUT CEPS
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